DOE

Subscribe to DOE

In a development that could cause every advanced reactor startup to reexamine its growth strategy, the US government (USG) yesterday afternoon issued a new framework concerning exports to China, which largely closes the export market to advanced reactor companies.

The framework document, which is available here and was described to a limited audience in a briefing yesterday that we attended, sets forth the following policy regarding exports of technology or technical data subject to the US Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear export control regulations in 10 CFR Part 810, and exports of equipment and materials under the NRC’s nuclear export control regulations in 10 CFR Part 110.

The DOE Part 810 export controls framework is likely of most interest to advanced reactor companies, and is summarized below:

  • Presumption of Denial for the Following Export Authorization Requests:
    • Any exports related of advanced reactor technologies (i.e., light water SMRs and non-light water reactors), and related fuel cycle exports.  It appears that fuel cycle exports that could benefit advanced reactors, even if designed primarily for traditional light water reactors, could get caught up in this “presumption of denial.”
    • Any export of codes or software.
    • Any exports at all to the company China General Nuclear (CGN) or its affiliates.  DOE will not provide a public list of affiliates, but applicants can go check with DOE beforehand.
    • Any “new technology transfers after January 1, 2018” are also presumed to be denied export authorization.  It is unclear exactly what this means, but it is potentially a catch-all to make clear the limited nature of those exports still permissible.
  • Exports for Which Approvals May Still be Attainable (Presumption of Approval, But After Heightened End User Review):
    • Amendments or extensions for existing authorizations “for technology transferred prior to January 1, 2018.”  This does not apply to advanced reactors.  It will also likely be an area of confusion going forward as to how the USG position against “new” technology transfers above will apply to these existing authorizations.
    • Certain technology transfers for operational safety purposes, with a clear operational safety benefit and after heightened review of the end user.
    • Transfers of technology required to support sale of an item that is “commercially available.”  This is likely to be limited in scope.

In case of a conflict, the presumption of denial appears to defeat the presumption of approval—e.g., exports to CGN appear off-limits no matter what.  A few other key points to relate:

  • NRC Export Control Policy Changes:  The changes to NRC export controls mimic those impacting DOE controls.  The key point is that any exports related to “direct economic competition with the United States” are presumed to be denied an NRC license.  Examples provided include sales to support the Hualong One and unique U.S. components for the CAP-1400 reactors.  Likely this would also catch any effort to support a Chinese advanced reactor.  Exports to support the AP-1000, or related projects in China that rely on current-gen technology, can potentially move forward, but will be heavily scrutinized.   In theory, sales of light water SMR or advanced reactors themselves are permitted too, but with no technology transfer above and beyond installation and operation.
  • Implications on Department of Commerce (DOC) Export Controls: Today’s action appears largely limited to 10 CFR Parts 110/810 nuclear export controls, and does not directly impact exports regulated by DOC.  However, we understand that DOC is currently considering potential new restrictions with regarding China.   These may involve changes in licensing policy, including adding licensing requirements for items that previously could be exported without a license.  Considering that DOC hosted this event, it would appear the agency staff at least agree in principle with the strong action taken there.
  • End User Reviews: There will be new, “case-by-case” heightened reviews for exports to non-CGN end users that assess risk of diversion, risk to parties in the deal, and risk to US national and economic security—and balance these risks against the economic and strategic benefits of the exchange.  DOE and the NRC may be able to place conditions on exports to mitigate the above-listed risks.    Exactly how these reviews will be conducted is likely still to be determined, including if DOE and NRC will want to go as far as what some other agencies (such as DOC) do with end user reviews.
  • Application to Chinese Nationals/Partially-Owned Businesses: To also make clear, this policy applies to hiring of Chinese foreign nationals in the United States, and can impact deals with entities that are just partially owned by Chinese nationals or businesses.  The authors asked the USG at the briefing as to whether this policy applied to deemed exports, and the USG panelists confirmed that it did.  They directed that questions related to partial ownership be directed to DOE for review.
  • Other Related Actions:  This policy change also highlights the recent CFIUS and DOC export controls legislation passed by Congress, which was again geared towards China.  To add, USG has started to implement parts of this legislation, including a CFIUS pilot program to implement the sections of that legislation concerning investments in critical technologies, likely including a broad scope of nuclear technologies.

All in all, this is just one more example of a renewed government focus on the national security implications of losing the US civil nuclear industry to foreign competitors, as highlighted in our Back from the Brink paper (which was featured in an event last week at the Center for Strategic and International Studies on Nuclear Energy, Naval Propulsion, and National Security).

Specific to China, since 2017 the USG has been looking at this issue, following a spate of IP theft and diversion cases that have not seemed to stem in recent years.  While the Allen Ho/CGN litigation was certainly a driver, USG panelists noted in their briefing many other examples of China allegedly diverting civilian nuclear resources and technology to military end uses, using a “whole nation” strategy.  This included forcing civilian institutions to do military nuclear work, comingling civil and military nuclear efforts (for example, in the area of floating reactors), diverting IP provided for civilian nuclear use to military end uses, and repurposing US civilian nuclear IP and codes for military end use.  The FBI representative appeared to indicate that there were other, classified examples.

For more information, please feel free to contact the authors.

Recently, the Hill has been taking a flurry of legislative actions that impact the advanced reactor community across all spectra.  We provide a summary of some of the major bills going through Congress below, including a couple which have recently become law or may become so soon.

Nuclear Energy Innovation Capabilities Act (NEICA) (S. 97). This bill, which has a long history before Congress, finally passed both the House and Senate on September 24, and was signed by the President into law Friday September 28.  The text of the enrolled bill (the bill that has passed both chambers of Congress in identical form and sent to be signed) can be found here.

NEICA tackles a number of issues, but as a theme largely directs the US Department of Energy (DOE) to move forward on a number of actions long advocated for by the advanced reactor community—including opening up the labs more for private sector use, advancing a test reactor plan, and increasing collaboration with the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).  As provided in the bill summary, DOE is instructed to:

  • Determine the need for a versatile reactor-based fast neutron source, which shall operate as a national user facility, and put forward a plan to construct and operate such a facility by the end of 2025.
  • Enhance its high-performance computation modeling and simulation techniques for advanced reactors.
  • Lead a program for testing of advanced reactor concepts (including physical testing), with a focus on removing licensing and technical uncertainty.  As part of this, the DOE is to work closely with the NRC to share technical expertise developed from this testing program and grant NRC staff access to the program and related sites to learn from any testing.  The goal of this is to help ensure the NRC has sufficient resources to license any reactor designs being tested.
  • Submit a budget proposal to Congress to perform the above activities.
  • Submit a report to Congress on fusion technologies under development (fusion is included within the bill’s broad definition of “advanced reactor”), with a focus on those technologies that can provide net energy production within 15 years after the start of construction of test or prototype facilities.
  • Develop an “Advanced Nuclear Energy Cost-Share Grant Program” to assist in paying NRC licensing fees for new reactor designs, including early stage activities such as development of a licensing plan.

NEICA was signed Friday along with H.R. 589, the DOE Research and Innovation Act, which also aims to shape DOE’s research agenda and use of the national laboratories to improve research collaboration and technology commercialization.

Energy-Related Appropriations Legislation (H.R. 5895). The President signed a broad appropriations bill on September 21, which covered funding for DOE.  The text of the enrolled bill can be found here, but summaries of the bill’s core DOE funding provisions can be found in a conference report, and a summary provided by the American Institute of Physics (AIP) here.  As represented in the AIP summary, the bill is largely a victory for DOE, with funding increases seemingly across the board, including a 10% increase in funding to the Office of Nuclear Energy and $65 million set aside for the versatile fast-neutron test reactor described above.

Nuclear Utilization of Keynote Energy Act (H.R. 1320). This bill passed the House on September 25.  The text of the bill can be found here.  It is targeted at NRC reform, and seeks among other things to:

  • Codify that up to $10.3M of the NRC’s work for advanced reactor readiness is to be removed from fee recovery (it also puts a cap on many other licensees’ annual fees).
  • Study the effect of removing the Atomic Energy Act’s restriction on foreign ownership, control, or domination of nuclear licenses (primarily affecting reactor licenses).
  • Study the elimination of the mandatory hearing requirement for uncontested reactor license applications.
  • Allow for the adoption of more informal hearing requirements for licensing proceedings.
  • Instruct the NRC as to more efficiently processing license applications, with a 42 month timeline for issuing safety and environmental reports after docketing of the application.
  • Establish community advisory boards in areas where plants are undergoing decommissioning.

Nuclear Energy Leadership Act (S. 3422). This bill was introduced into the Senate earlier this month, with 9  The text of the bill can be found here, and we provide a thorough summary in our past blog entry.  This bill would build on the Nuclear Energy Innovation Capabilities Act to, among other things:

  • Direct the U.S. government to enter into long-term power purchase agreements with nuclear reactors.
  • Promote the development of advanced reactors and fuel by strategically aligning U.S. government and industry interests, which is intended to enable U.S. developers to compete with their state-sponsored competitors from Russia and China.
  • Further push DOE to construct a fast neutron-capable research facility, which is crucial to test important new nuclear technologies and demonstrate their safe and reliable operation. Currently the only two facilities in the world like this are in Russia and China.
  • Develop a source of high-assay low-enriched uranium, which is the intended fuel for many advanced reactor designs, from U.S. government stockpiles. Again, both China and Russia have these capabilities domestically, but the U.S. does not.

This bill recognizes the national security implications that come with the long-term neglect of our nuclear industry, which is outlined in our recent paper published by Center for Strategic and International Studies, entitled  “Back from the Brink: A Threatened Nuclear Energy Industry Compromises National Security.”

* * *

This review only highlights some of the nuclear-related bills currently before Congress—others of which also touch on reform to, e.g., our national nuclear export controls regime.  For further information on the bills described above or on other nuclear legislation, please contact the authors.

A bipartisan group of nine U.S. senators has introduced the Nuclear Energy Leadership Act (NELA) (S 3422), a bill designed to help the United States return to its lead in nuclear energy technology.  The bill sponsors explain that the U.S. has yielded this position to Russia and China–weakening our energy security, economic competitiveness, and national security.  The blog authors, in collaboration with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, have recently published on just this issue in “Back from the Brink: A Threatened Nuclear Energy Industry Compromises National Security” (Jul. 2018).

The bill covers a range of activities to fund research, development and accelerated deployment of advanced nuclear energy technologies.  The one-page summary of the bill issued by the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources explains–

To reestablish global leadership, the U.S. must have a healthy nuclear industry capable of designing and deploying the most advanced reactor concepts in the world at a competitive price. As we look for clean, safe, reliable, flexible, and diverse power sources to meet the nation’s energy needs, advanced reactors will play a critical role in that mix.

Notably, the bill would:

  • Direct the U.S. government to enter into long-term power purchase agreements (PPAs) with nuclear reactors.
  • Promote the development of advanced reactors and fuel by strategically aligning U.S. government and industry interests, which is intended to enable U.S. developers to compete with their state-sponsored competitors from Russia and China.
  • Construct a fast neutron-capable research facility, which is crucial to test important new nuclear technologies and demonstrate their safe and reliable operation. Currently the only two facilities in the world like this are in Russia and China.
  • Develop a source of high-assay low-enriched uranium, which is the intended fuel for many advanced reactor designs, from U.S. government stockpiles. Again, both China and Russia have these capabilities domestically, but the U.S. does not.

Section by Section Breakdown

The Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources also released a section-by-section analysis of NEAL, which we summarize below, paying particular attention to the PPA provision, which could be a near-term game changer for the advanced reactor industry.

  • S. Government Power Purchase Agreements (Sections 2 and 3). Notably, the bill would create a pilot program for the U.S. government to enter into long-term PPAs with commercial nuclear reactors.  Under the bill—
    • The Secretary of Energy must consult and coordinate with other Federal departments and agencies that could benefit from the program, including the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Homeland Security.
    • At least one PPA has to be in place with a commercial nuclear reactor by the end of 2023.
    • The maximum length of the PPA is extended from 10 to 40 years, and the PPAs can be scored annually. Currently, nuclear energy is at a disadvantage when competing for federal PPA, due to a law that pre-dates commercial nuclear power and limits PPAs to 10 years. Initial capital costs for nuclear reactors are paid for over a period beyond ten years, which means 10-year PPAs do not work for nuclear projects, so this change would be an important development for the industry.
    • In carrying out the pilot program, the Secretary of Energy must give special consideration to PPAs for “first-of-a-kind or early deployment nuclear technologies that can provide reliable and resilient power to high-value assets for national security purposes or other purposes…in the national interest, especially in remote off-grid scenarios or grid-connected scenarios that can provide capabilities commonly known as ‘islanding power capabilities’ during an emergency scenario.”

The other provisions of the bill, as described in the section-by-section analysis are summarized below.

  • Advanced Nuclear Reactor Research and Development Goals (Section 4). In order for the American nuclear industry to compete with state-owned or state-sponsored developers in rival nations – especially China and Russia – significant collaboration between the federal government, National Labs, and private industry is needed to accelerate innovation. This provision directs the Department of Energy (DOE) to establish specific goals to align these sectors and send a strong and coherent signal that the U.S. is re-establishing itself as a global leader in clean advanced nuclear technology.
  • Nuclear Energy Strategic Plan (Section 5). There has not been a cohesive long-term strategy for the direction of U.S. nuclear science and engineering research and development policy across administrations.  This section requires DOE’s Office of Nuclear Energy to develop a 10-year strategic plan that supports advanced nuclear R&D goals that will foster breakthrough innovation to help advanced nuclear reactors reach the market.
  • Versatile, Reactor-Based Fast Neutron Source/Facilities Required for Advanced Reactor R&D (Section 6). For the U.S. to be a global leader in advancing nuclear technology, we need the ability to test reactor fuels and materials. Currently, the only machines capable of producing a fast neutron spectrum are located in Russia and China. This measure directs DOE to construct a fast neutron-capable research facility, which is necessary to test important reactor components and demonstrate their safe and reliable operation – crucial for licensing advanced reactor concepts.
  • Advanced Nuclear Fuel Security Program/High-Assay Low-Enriched Uranium Availability (Section 7). A healthy domestic uranium mining, enrichment, and fuel fabrication capability that meets industry needs is another prerequisite for reestablishing U.S. nuclear leadership. Many advanced reactors will rely on high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU), but no domestic capability exists to produce it. This section establishes a program to provide a minimum amount of HALEU to U.S. advanced reactor developers from DOE stockpiles, until a long-term domestic supply is developed.
  • University Nuclear Leadership Program/Workforce Development (Section 8). The nuclear energy industry, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the National Nuclear Security Administration all require a world-class, highly-skilled workforce to develop, regulate, and safeguard the next generation of advanced reactors. This section creates a university nuclear leadership program to meet these workforce needs.

The bill was introduced by  Sens. Lisa Murkowski (R-Alaska), Cory Booker (D-N.J.), James Risch (R-Idaho), Shelley Moore Capito (R-W.Va.), Mike Crapo (R-Idaho), Richard Durbin (D-Ill.), Joe Manchin (D-W.Va.), Sheldon Whitehouse (D-R.I.) and Chris Coons (D-Del.).

For questions on the bill or the links between national security and the commercial nuclear power industry, please contact one of the authors listed below.

This month, the NRC published an early draft regulatory guide on the content of license applications for non-LWRs.  The document is designed to help license applicants apply the NRC’s movement towards a risk-informed/performance-based regulatory approach towards the drafting of an actual license application.

The document is in part the result of the Southern Company-led Licensing Modernization Project, which has resulted in the issuance of a number of informal reports discussing licensing reform for non-LWR reactors.  This draft regulatory guide is designed to more formally capture the results of those reports and follow-on discussions.   It addresses the designation of licensing basis events; safety classification and performance criteria for structures, systems, and components; and evaluation of defense in depth adequacy.  importantly, it largely adopts detailed draft industry guidance set forth in March of this year, although with certain clarifications.  One area of particular NRC focus concerns probabilistic risk analyses (“PRA”), where the agency appears to show a little hesitancy with the broad use of PRA proposed in the industry guidance.

The draft guidance is being issued to support future discussions, in particular an Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards meeting tentatively scheduled for October 30, 2018.  For more about the Licensing Modernization project, or recent NRC and industry guidance on contents for non-LWR license applications, please contact the authors.

In today’s international nuclear marketplace, foreign investment is a significant source of capital for U.S. next-generation nuclear ventures. However, about-to-be signed legislation has the potential to broadly expand the ability of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (“CFIUS”) to review foreign investment into the United States directed towards the nuclear industry, as well as the ability of the U.S. government to control exports of emerging nuclear technologies.

The new legislation, expected to be signed today, will among other things: (1) increase the number of transactions falling under CFIUS jurisdiction, (2) make some CFIUS reviews mandatory, (3) and give CFIUS the ability to suspend pending investments.  The legislation will also (4) expand export controls for “emerging and foundational technologies.”  The advanced reactor community should be aware of the legislation as it could impact future investment plans.  The community may also want to involve itself in expected rulemakings that will clarify important parts of the legislation.

As background, CFIUS is a multi-agency committee, led by the Treasury Department, which has the ability to review foreign investments into the United States that pose a threat to national security. Under the current law, CFIUS is able to review transactions that allow a foreign entity to gain “control” over a US business that poses a national security risk—including U.S. businesses holding or involved in critical infrastructure and critical technologies, which includes nuclear power.  CFIUS works aside a separate, complex nuclear export control regime to police efforts by foreign powers to infiltrate critical infrastructure and technologies in a manner harmful to U.S. national interests.

The about-to-be-signed legislation, entitled the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 and the Export Controls Act of 2018, have both been inserted into the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019.  Hogan Lovells’ International Trade Practice has summarized key elements of the legislation in two client alerts (here and here).  The legislation has many components, but a few of which are worth calling out in more detail:

(1) Increasing the Scope of CFIUS Jurisdiction: Currently, the touchstone of CFIUS jurisdiction is whether any transaction would give a foreign entity control of a US business.   However, CFIUS will now be able to review many other types of transactions, including “any other investment[s]” (to be clarified by CFIUS by rulemaking) that concern critical infrastructure, critical technologies, or sensitive personal data of U.S. citizens.

Depending on how future CFIUS rulemaking efforts proceed, this could capture many types of investments in advanced reactor start-ups or fusion ventures, regardless if control is at stake—potentially even if the transaction just results in the foreign entity gaining access to material non-public technical information. CFIUS will also now be able to review changes to existing investor rights that could lead to the same result, as well as certain investments designed to get around CFIUS review.  Certain limited carve-outs exist for private equity and venture investments, but these are still to be clarified further.

(2)Making CFIUS Submissions Mandatory: Currently, while CFIUS can itself seek review of a transaction, generally no entity is required to submit a transaction to CFIUS for review (i.e., submissions are voluntary). However, businesses seeking investment involving foreign government backing will now have to submit “declarations” to CFIUS, and CFIUS would have 30 days to take a number of potential actions (again, to be clarified further by rulemaking). This piece of the legislation, like many others parts, is in response to increasing concerns around Chinese state-owned investment into sensitive US businesses.

(3) Allowing CFIUS to Suspend Transactions:  Currently, CFIUS can only recommend to the President that a transaction be blocked, making it in practice very hard and rare for a transaction actually to be blocked.  However, now CFIUS can suspend a proposed/pending transaction that appears to pose a threat to national security while it conducts its review.  This gives the committee a strong new tool to effectively kill transactions it does not favour.

(4)Intensifying U.S. Government Export Controls:  Alongside CFIUS reform, new legislation will allow the U.S. government to intensify how it controls exports of “emerging and foundational technologies.”  Currently such exports are controlled by a variety of regulators, including the U.S. Departments of Commerce and State, and in the case of nuclear power, also the U.S. Department of Energy and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, under well-defined but also sometimes slow-to-change regimes.

This broad, new legislation appears designed to gives the Executive Branch important new mechanisms to quickly apply export controls to emergent fields that concern U.S. economic interests.  Within the nuclear space, this could impact both novel fission and fusion technologies that are either not covered or loosely regulated under current export control regimes—although its actual impact will follow only after this legislation is applied in practice.

While certain parts of this legislation may come into effect immediately, both CFIUS and the Executive Branch will have to undertake rulemakings and additional actions to fully implement its new powers.  This will provide opportunities for potentially affected parties to get their voice known, especially as the role of (and concern with) foreign investment in U.S. nuclear innovation is only expected to grow.

For more about CFIUS and nuclear export controls, as well as the above-described legislation, please contact the authors.

A recent headline in the energy trade press would not likely have caught the attention of the advanced nuclear industry: “Trump’s DOE punishes Obama-era solar success story.” A casual reader might quickly dismiss the story as indicative of a Trump Administration bias against renewable energy. The details reported in the story, however, convey a far different message—one that is great significance to the many advanced nuclear technology companies that are responding to DOE’s funding opportunity announcement for advanced nuclear development.

The E&E News article reports that a company by the name of 1366 Technologies accepted millions of dollars in DOE funding to develop a process to reduce the cost of producing silicon wafers. In return, it made certain commitments routinely required of recipients of DOE technology funding: to engage in substantial U.S. manufacture of the technology, to disclose to DOE patents produced with DOE financial assistance, to give DOE a royalty-free license for government use, and to give DOE so-called “march-in rights” to license the technology to others if the funding recipient fails to use the technology itself.

According to the published story, DOE has sought to enforce the commitment 1366 Technologies made to build its solar wafer manufacturing plant incorporating the DOE-funded technology in the U.S., specifically in upstate New York. Delays in obtaining a wholly separate DOE loan guarantee are said to account for a decision by 1366 to instead build its first plant in Asia. E&E News reports that DOE has responded with a submission to the United States Trade Representative suggesting that the failure to comply with the U.S. manufacture commitment should be weighed in considering a request by 1366 for exemption from the 30 percent tariff that generally applies to foreign manufacturers of solar panels. DOE is also reportedly evaluating its options with respect to 1366’s failure to disclose patents it filed while it was accepting DOE financial assistance. Under DOE intellectual property (IP) rules, the failure to make a required disclosure could result in a loss of rights in those patents.

This is not fairly characterized as an instance of the Trump Administration attacking the solar industry. Rather, it represents a continuation of the practice that the Obama Administration and others before it pursued (albeit with varying degrees of ardor) of ensuring that the American taxpayer gets the benefit of its bargain for assisting in the advancement of energy technologies. That funding is designed to advance U.S. competitiveness in energy technology and energy manufacturing. In DOE’s view, allowing the IP that results from the taxpayer investment to be shipped abroad for commercialization can defeat the purpose of the taxpayers’ investment. DOE’s views are supported by statute (in particular, this is the intent behind the Bayh Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200 – 212).

This is why the advanced nuclear technology industry should be paying close attention to the 1366 case. The FOA for advanced nuclear technology puts great emphasis on the desire to rebuild U.S. nuclear manufacturing capability. DOE has recently announced its first round of awards under the FOA. Additional applicants have submitted in the second round, and many others are preparing to submit one or more applications over the five years that DOE has said the FOA will remain open. The FOA represents a great opportunity to make important advances in nuclear technology prowess and to restore the U.S. nuclear supply chain to its past pre-eminence. That is what DOE expressly seeks to do. Therefore, it is important to understand and to put in place a program to assure compliance with the “strings” that are attached to the DOE money.

More than 10 pages of the lengthy FOA are devoted to the applicable IP rules. The eyes of an enthusiastic applicant might easily glaze over when they get to those 10 pages, but that would be a mistake. The rules reflect the implementation of statutory requirements, and they are unique to government-funded IP. They may be unfamiliar to those schooled in standard IP rules and practices associated with filing for patent rights. The ultimate commercial success of developing a great new technology may depend on understanding the obligations, managing the risks, engaging with DOE candidly when unanticipated challenges arise, and of course internalizing what we all already know: there really is no free money.

Applicants for DOE funding worry a lot about the government royalty-free license and the march-in rights (which the government has never exercised). However, the story about 1366 Technologies shows that those who accept federal funding to develop their technologies should have far greater concern about meeting the commitments they make to manufacture the technology in the U.S. and to disclose the patents they develop with government funds. In our experience, DOE is open to discussion and negotiation, within the constraints of its statutory obligations. However, DOE has demonstrated its willingness to employ at least some of the powerful enforcement tools it has at its disposal to enforce those obligations if it concludes the circumstances warrant such action.

In short, it is important to understand and take seriously the substantial U.S. manufacture and patent disclosure obligations that come with a financial assistance, because DOE does.

For more information, please contact Mary Anne Sullivan.

On Sunday, the popular TV show Madam Secretary gave a starring role to the climate and security benefits of nuclear power. The episode, titled “Thin Ice,” which is still available on the CBS website, proffered a full-throated defense of the climate benefits of nuclear power, turned a grassroots activist organization into a supporter of nuclear energy, and showcased how a nuclear powered ice breaker protected the Arctic from a foreign incursion. It capped with Secretary McCord convincing the show’s President to revise the national nuclear policy. As Michael Shellenberger opined following the episode (he also walks through the episode in detail), this marks a turning point for Hollywood, and “represents a popular culture breakthrough for the pro-nuclear movement.”  We encourage everyone to watch the episode!

From there, the week has only gotten better for nuclear innovation. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed “the first and most intensive phase of review for” NuScale’s Design Certification Application for its small modular reactor. The NuScale design review has six phases to its schedule; but the first review sets the tenor, as it establishes the NRC staff’s preliminary safety evaluation of the reactor and encompasses a large portion of the requests for additional information. NuScale performed admirably in both areas. Along with this significant milestone—which derisks the company’s regulatory path forward—NuScale also received US$40 million from U.S. Department of Energy to continue advancing its innovative new, passively safe reactor design. And even the issue of nuclear waste storage might see progress, as the Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act of 2018 will get a vote on the floor of the House soon. The bill will move forward interim storage of spent nuclear fuel, and seek resolution on the licensing of a final national repository.

And apart from advancements on earth, NASA successfully tested KRUSTY, or “Kilopower Reactor Using Stirling Technology,” a nuclear reactor for potential moon and Mars bases. NASA personnel stated after the successful Nevada trial that “[n]o matter what environment we expose it to, the reactor performs very well.” NASA, along with Hollywood and Congress it seems, has taken a renewed interest in the role nuclear power can play in space exploration.

If you wish to learn more about any of these encouraging events, please contact the authors.

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) this week announced the award of approximately $60 million to 13 advanced reactor projects—the first under the funding opportunity announcement (FOA) “U.S. Industry Opportunities for Advanced Nuclear Technology Development.”  The 13 projects cover a diversity of steps in the commercialization process:

  • 4 concern modeling and development pathways;
  • 2 concern regulatory assistance and engaging in pre-licensing reviews;
  • 2 concern demonstration readiness; and
  • 5 other awardees received GAIN vouchers for research and development.

The R&D topics likewise span a broad spectrum, from fuel cycle facilities to reactor design.  More information on the awards can be found in the press release.

DOE notes that these are just the first announcements, and a “subsequent quarterly application review and selection processes will be conducted over the next five years.”  Moreover, “DOE intends to apply up to $40 million of additional FY 2018 funding to the next two quarterly award cycles for innovative proposals under this FOA.”  So keep on the lookout for more opportunities!

The awards follows fast from Secretary Perry’s announcement of a “Statement of Intent” to cooperate on fast-spectrum sodium-cooled advanced reactors.  As provided in the announcement: “Cooperation on the development of advanced fast neutron sodium-cooled reactors will explore areas of collaboration ranging from modeling, simulation, and validation to technology testing, access to supply chain, experimental facilities, and advanced materials.”  This type of work buttresses Secretary’s claim that DOE wants to refocus on nuclear to make it “cool again.”  To learn more about DOE’s bilateral cooperation efforts, please see here.

For more on DOE funding opportunity announcements and how to apply, and on opportunities to take advantage of DOE bilateral cooperation agreements, please contact the authors.

The start of the month has proven to be an exciting one for nuclear innovation in D.C.  A number of legal and regulatory activities have taken place which have implications for the next-generation nuclear industry, just a few of which are noted below.  (And for those at the ARPA-E conference, see our blog author Amy Roma speak today at the 2:15 panel “Quantifying Technical Risk for Advanced Nuclear Reactors”).

  • Last week was “Nuclear Innovation Week” in D.C. It consisted of three events highlighting both nuclear innovation and legal/regulatory reform: (i) Third Way’s Annual Advanced Nuclear Summit, (ii) the Nuclear Energy Institute’s (NEI’s) Nuclear R&D Summit, and (iii) a joint symposium hosted by the Gateway for Accelerated Innovation in Nuclear, NEI, and the Electric Power Research Institute.  Recordings of events from the Third Way summit are available online, and Amy spoke there on the topic of “Will the US Be a Global Leader in Advanced Nuclear Energy.”
  • In Congress, the Nuclear Energy Innovation Capabilities Act (S.97) passed the Senate.  The legislation would help move advanced reactor concepts forward by encouraging the creation of a fast neutron test reactor, as well as a user facility called the National Reactor Innovation Center.  While it is unclear how money will follow, it is a step in the right direction and recognizes the critical need for test facilities for next-generation nuclear reactors. Of its other more notable elements, the bill would also push forward an “Advanced Nuclear Energy Cost-Share Grant Program,” under which DOE can make cost-share grants to applicants for the purpose of funding a portion of NRC licensing fees, including both pre-application and application reviews.
  • The NRC issued Regulatory Guide 1.232, “Guidance for Developing Principal Design Criteria For Non-Light-Water Reactors.” As we discussed when the draft regulatory guide came out, this is a critical guidance document for non-light water reactors.  Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 sets for the general design criteria for NRC-licensed reactors, which are essentially the bounding safety requirements every new reactor has to meet.  These requirements, however, are designed for light-water reactors and do not apply well to non-light water designs (e.g., Criterion 14 sets requirements concerning reactor “pressure” boundaries, but many advanced reactors would not operate above atmospheric pressure).  There are three appendices to the report, which set forth general “advanced reactor design criteria,” as well as specific design criteria for sodium-cooled fast reactors and modular high-temperature gas-cooled reactors.  This guidance document, which attempts to update the NRC’s general design criteria to address this disconnect, is the product of a years-long DOE-NRC effort, paired with industry and public input.

And the month is not letting up.  This week is the NRC’s annual Regulatory Information Conference, where advanced reactors are taking center stage.  This week is also the ARPA-E Energy Innovation Summit, with Amy speaking on the panel, “Quantifying Technical Risk for Advanced Nuclear Reactors” (2:15 Tuesday).  ARPA-E has established a program to fund enabling technologies for next-generation reactors, called “MEITNER.”  The program seeks to help nuclear innovators leapfrog in development by providing advanced modeling and simulation tools, access to subject matter experts from nuclear and non-nuclear disciplines, and collaborative design assistance.  APRA-E is in itself an novel concept for how to commercialize technology research, and uses unique funding mechanisms to more efficiently fund energy innovation.

For more on any of the above topics, or on what else is going on in the nation’s Capital in support of nuclear energy, please contact the authors.

The House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Energy held a hearing February 6, 2018 to discuss the challenges facing America’s nuclear infrastructure, including advanced reactor development.  The hearing was called “DOE Modernization: Advancing the Economic and National Security Benefits of America’s Nuclear Infrastructure.” A video of the hearing can be watched here.

A background memorandum released in advance explained that the hearing would explore the following important topics:

  • National security implications associated with U.S. nuclear leadership and a domestic nuclear energy industry;
  • The outlook for domestic and international development of nuclear energy and application of nuclear technologies;
  • Challenges and opportunities regarding maintaining the components of a domestic nuclear fuel cycle; and
  • Options to develop and deploy advanced nuclear technologies

The hearing witnesses included (their statements are also provided below):

  • Mr. Art Atkins, Associate Deputy Administrator for Global Material Security, U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration: Witness Statement
  • Mr. Victor McCree, Executive Director of Operations, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission: Witness Statement
  • Mr. Ed McGinnis, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy: Witness Statement
  • Mr. James Owendoff, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Environmental Management: Witness Statement
  • Dr. Ashley Finan, Policy Director, Nuclear Innovation Alliance: Witness Statement
  • Ms. Maria Korsnick, President and CEO, Nuclear Energy Institute: Witness Statement
  • The Honorable Bill Ostendorff, Former NRC Commissioner and Distinguished Visiting Professor of National Security, U.S. Naval Academy: Witness Statement
  • Dr. Mark Peters, Director, Idaho National Laboratory: Witness Statement
  • Mr. David Trimble, Director, Government Accountability Office, Natural Resources and Environment: Witness Statement

Summary of Key Issues for Advanced Reactor Community

During his opening remarks, Full Committee Chairman Greg Walden (R-OR) noted that “[a]t root today, is a question of our nation’s capabilities not only to propel nuclear innovation generally, but to ensure an infrastructure that is critical to our economic and our national security.” He promised to align U.S. policy with a changing world: “we must recognize the world looks different than it did at the birth of the nuclear age. Consequently, we must take steps to update the relevant policies. These policies must be forward looking to enable innovation and the development and deployment of new advanced nuclear technologies.”

Once witness questioning began, the Subcommittee quickly honed in on issues facing the advanced reactor community and expressed bipartisan support for U.S. government help to develop and deploy these innovative new designs. Among the issues discussed were the following:

  • SMR commercialization and deployment schedule

The first question asked at the hearing, by Subcommittee Chairman Fred Upton (R-MI), was on small modular reactor (SMR) commercialization and when the U.S. was going to see SMR designs being approved and deployed in the commercial sector. In response, Ed McGinnis, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy explained: “We are at a tipping point,” with the U.S. leading in design development but challenged in deployment of the technologies. He went on to note that NuScale project that can be “game changing” if successfully deployed.

Last year, reactor designer NuScale submitted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission the first SMR reactor design certification application  in the United States. The NRC recently approved–in a first of a kind decision–that NuScale would not need a safety-related electrical power system. This means that the NRC believes the reactor can remain in a safe condition in the event it loses electricity. Currently, all nuclear power plants in the U.S. have safety-related electrical power systems. And the fact that NuScale does not need one is a testament to the inherent different nature of SMRs—and the first time the NRC has recognized as such during its review of an application.

On that front, Victor McCree, the NRC’s Executive Director of Operations, explained during the hearing that the NRC’s decision about NuScale reflects a “philosophical” change that will lead to more efficient and effective reviews. Mr. McCree continued on to explain that an NRC approval of the NuScale design would open the market in a way that large reactors cannot, including by being more affordable and improving grid reliability. Mr. McGinnis further explained that with a number of large-scale reactors facing shutdown, getting SMRs into the pipeline is an imperative, and among other things, DOE was working on integrating SMRs with wind turbines and solar plants. With SMRs versatility and fast ramp up ability, Mr. McGinnis explained, SMRs could be paired with renewables to firm up their intermittent power and delivery of emissions free power.

  • Concern with amount of DOE funding to support SMR commercialization and deployment

Several members expressed concern that—with less than US$30 million invested in advanced reactors—whether DOE is really pushing for commercialization of SMRs. In response, Mr. McGinnis noted that a lot of work was being performed at the national labs and DOE continues to work on deployment matters.

  • High-assay LEU and Test Reactors

Mr. McGinnis from DOE also explained that DOE was working towards development of a fast neutron reactor and growing a capacity for high-assay LEU. Mr. McGinnis acknowledged that next-generation nuclear innovators need a test reactor, which itself would require high-assay LEU. He added that NNSA is taking seriously the challenge of developing a high-assay LEU capacity for testing and eventual industry use.

  • Deployment of US SMRs overseas

A number of members asked about deployment of US SMRs abroad. In response, Mr. McGinnis remarked that a number of countries are interested in U.S. SMR designs and watching their progress. He remarked that the U.S. is the world expert in designing SMRs, and that if the U.S. was able to prove the technology domestically it would open up the international market. The hearing participants also discussed ways to speed up the U.S. nuclear export approval process. On that last point, Congressman Bill Johnson (R-OH) noted that he intended to introduce legislation soon to improve the export control authorization process. At the end of 2017, Chairman Upton and Congressman Johnson sent a letter to Energy Secretary Rick Perry saying that the slow pace of DOE authorizations for commercial nuclear energy exports is having harmful consequences for U.S. competitiveness and national security. “While DOE is in the process of implementing some targeted reforms, more work remains to accelerate agency decision-making so that our domestic nuclear technology leaders have timely answers necessary to compete effectively with other nations’ nuclear programs,” the letter said.

  • NRC fee reform

When asked about if the NRC is undergoing reviews of its fee structure and looking for ways to improve methodology especially when non-LWR reactors look for licensing, Mr. McCree confirmed that the NRC is looking at this issue.

With a flurry of attention on advanced reactors lately, the hearing brings welcome attention the advanced reactor community needs. Please contact the authors with any questions.